Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 Reconceptualizing the Future of
Environmental Law
Spring 2015

Article 8

April 2015

The Safe Drinking Water / Food Law Nexus
Margot J. Pollans
Pace University School of Law, mpollans@law.pace.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law
Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Water Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Margot J. Pollans, The Safe Drinking Water / Food Law Nexus, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 501 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/8
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

8_POLLANS FINAL

10/1/2015 10:43 AM

ARTICLE

The Safe Drinking Water / Food Law Nexus
MARGOT J. POLLANS*
At 2 AM on August 2, 2014, the Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency issued the following warning to the citizens of
Toledo: “Do Not Drink.”1 The Ohio City’s tap water was
contaminated with microcystin, a toxin that can cause diarrhea,
vomiting, and abnormal liver function.2 The source was an algal
bloom in Lake Erie resulting from high levels of agricultural
fertilizers and animal waste.3 For three days, Toledo residents
drank only bottled water.
This is just one of many similar examples of agricultural
contamination of urban drinking water supplies. Creating a
physical connection between urban and rural communities, this
pollution highlights the need for an environmentally-minded and
systems-based food and agriculture law.
Despite over forty years of extensive federal regulation of
water pollution, agricultural waste, most of which enters drinking
water as “nonpoint source pollution,” remains a significant threat
to safe drinking water as well as aquatic ecosystems. Climate

* Teaching Fellow. UCLA School of Law, Resnick Program for Food Law and
Policy, 2013-15. Assistant Professor of Law, Pace Law School, 2015- . Thanks to
Jason Czarnezki and Ann Carlson for their helpful comments.
1. Codi Kozacek, Seven Ohio Drinking Water Sources Don’t Meet State Water
Quality Standards for Toxic Algae, CIRCLE OF BLUE (Aug. 25, 2014, 4:58 PM),
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2014/world/seven-ohio-drinking-watersources-dont-meet-state-water-quality-standards-toxic-algae/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/8DBW-T6DR.
2. Id.
3. Id.

501

1

8_POLLANS FINAL

502

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

10/1/2015 10:43 AM

[Vol. 32

change threatens to exacerbate this threat.4 Furthermore, the
Clean Water Act’s failure to address these harms is well
documented.5
The Act provides no federally enforceable
mechanism for mitigating nonpoint source pollution. Many have
proposed solutions including radical amendments of the statute
itself, aggressive state action to fill the gap, and expansion of the
United States Department of Agriculture’s conservation programs
which pay farmers to change their practices to reduce water
contamination.6
As a component of food law, the Clean Water Act’s failure to
address agricultural water pollution must be understood as a
back drop to a companion federal statute: the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA).7 The SDWA requires the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to set drinking water standards for
harmful contaminants, and it requires that public water utilities
meet those standards either through water filtration and
treatment, or through source water protection.8
The SDWA is widely attacked, particularly by local
government officials, as an unfunded mandate imposing

4. Robert W. Adler, Agriculture and Water Quality: A Climate-Integrated
Perspective, 37 VT. L. REV. 847, 875 (2013) (describing how climate change might
affect existing water quality problems).
5. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 298-304 (2000).
6. See id.; Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25
ENVTL. L. 973 (1995); Terence J. Centner, Nutrient Pollution from Land
Applications of Manure: Discerning a Remedy for Pollution, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 213 (2010); John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local
Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 413-16 (2002); J.B. Ruhl &
James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010);
David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory
Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 515, 524-25 (1996).
7. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2012).
8. Id. § 300g-1 (mandating that the EPA set national drinking water
standards); id. § 300g-2 (delegating primary enforcement authority to the
states). Public water utilities are utilities that provide water to at least twentyfive people or have at least fifteen service connections. Id. § 300f(4). The
statutory requirements thus do not apply to wells or to very small drinking
water systems.
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excessive, and often unjustified, costs on local governments.9
Critics argue that its uniform and risk-averse requirements
reflect the need to devolve authority to states to engage in more
location-specific standard setting. Proponents argue that the cost
and complexity of risk assessment combined with the need to
provide uniformly clean water to all, justify federal
intervention.10
This debate, which focuses on the SDWA in isolation from the
Clean Water Act, misses a central flaw in the structure of the
SDWA. As implemented by the EPA and the states, the SDWA
assigns primary responsibility for provision of clean water to
municipal and regional water utilities that often have little or no
control over drinking water sources.
Where point source pollution is the primary threat to safe
water, this allocation is reasonable. Water utilities are simply
providing a backstop to ensure that water, whose content is often
already heavily policed under the Clean Water Act, is safe to
drink.
By contrast, where the primary threat to safe drinking water
is nonpoint source pollution, water utilities provide what is often
the first line of defense. Of the nearly ninety pollutants for which
the EPA sets SDWA standards, at least twenty-four enter

9. Scott D. Laufenberg, The Struggle of Cities to Implement the Safe
Drinking Water Act in the Context of Intergovernmental Relations, 3 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 495, 499 (1998) (observing that the SDWA can be extremely
burdensome for municipalities adjacent to agricultural communities); David L.
Markell, The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation: Shoring
Up Our Federal System, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 895, 898-90 (1993) (describing
concern that the SDWA fails to prioritize among various risks); Jeffrey Marks,
The Role of Federal Environmental Mandates in Intergovernmental Relations, 20
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 17, 23 (1996) (observing that many local officials
have called for increased local flexibility in standard setting and explaining that
tension arises when federal financial support does not keep up with rising
compliance costs); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the
“New (New) Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV.
97, 202 (1996) (arguing that the SDWA regulations do not allow adequate
tailoring to local conditions or adequate assessment of compliance feasibility).
10. See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 9, at 140, 171-73 (noting that cities and
counties identify the SDWA as one of the most expensive federal mandates but
expressing concern that “unrestricted devolution of fundamental regulatory
decisions to the local level” could result in massive inequality in availability of
safe drinking water).
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waterways through agricultural nonpoint source pollution.11 The
list includes pesticides, herbicides, nitrates, and microbial
contaminants from animal waste.12 Without independent source
controls, water utilities must engage in burdensome cleanup in
order to meet SDWA standards.13
Taken together, the Clean Water Act and the SDWA thus
assign primary responsibility for nonpoint source pollution
cleanup to water utilities. Although both statutes envision a role
for states in establishing source control programs, neither statute
mandates such controls, and many states have declined to
develop robust programs.14 In the remainder of this essay, I will
draw three conclusions about this dynamic.
First, in the long run, particularly if predictions are correct
that climate change will exacerbate the risk of drinking water
contamination from agricultural pollutants, the dynamic
described in the preceding paragraphs could serve as an

11. EPA, 816-F-09-004, NAT’L PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS (2009),
available at http://water.epa.gov/drink/contaminants/upload/mcl.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/4MQQ-Q7V5. The Twenty-four pollutants are those identified by
the EPA as entering drinking water from agricultural-related runoff. ENVTL.
WORKING GRP., DRINKING WATER POLLUTION HAS MANY SOURCES (2009),
available
at
http://www.ewg.org/tap-water/sourcesofwaterpollution.php,
archived at http://perma.cc/KC8W-BWEJ. The Environmental Working Group
(EWG) identifies a total of ninety-seven agricultural-related contaminants in
drinking water. Of these, thirty-five are regulated. For those thirty-five, EWG
found that 127 million people had been exposed to levels exceeding EPA
guidelines. Id. See also Ronald Munger et al., Intrauterine Growth Retardation
in Iowa Communities with Herbicide-Contaminated Drinking Water Supplies,
105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 308 (1997), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1470002/pdf/envhper00316-0054.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/6PAR-6ETM (discussing pesticide contamination in humans).
12. See EPA, supra note 11.
13. For instance, following a cryptosporidium outbreak in 1993, the
Milwaukee Water Works invested eighty-nine million dollars for capital
improvements to its water filtration systems. Don Behm, Milwaukee Marks 20
Years Since Cryptosporidium Outbreak, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2013,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/milwaukee-marks-20-years-sincecryptosporidium-outbreak-099dio5-201783191.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/HWH3-GUAM. See infra notes 16, 21-25, and accompanying text (discussing
the potential for water utilities to engage in source control).
14. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 4, at 855-56 (noting that while there are some
watershed specific success stories the overall picture is bleak). See also Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2.
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important catalyst for change.15 As filtration and treatment costs
rise, water utilities and the state agencies overseeing them will
continue to seek alternative approaches, including using
litigation to reallocate mitigation costs from municipal ratepayers
to farmers.16 They may also put pressure on state governments
to develop more comprehensive nonpoint source pollution
regulatory programs. Public support for such efforts may also
increase in response to high salience contamination events, such
as the Toledo incident described above. In other words, this type
of extremely costly and public pollution in urban areas creates a
constituency for environmental protection that may not have
existed before.
Second, the failure to regulate nonpoint source pollution
creates an arbitrary assignment of pollution abatement costs. The
extent to which a water utility provides the first line of defense or
merely end-of-line finishing cleanup depends on the nature of the
pollution source.17 Those within the direct ambit of agricultural
15. See Adler, supra note 4, at 875 (describing the potential effects of climate
change on drinking water).
16. The Clean Water Act preempts interstate nuisance suits under federal
common law. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the Clean
Water Act preempted interstate nuisance claims under federal common law).
But, water utilities can still bring suit under state common law. Int’l Paper Co.
v. Ouellete, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). Interstate suits, by state or private parties,
can also be brought under state law provided that they are brought under the
law of the source state. Id. (holding that the Clean Water Act preempted the
common law of an affected state where that state, or a citizen of that state,
attempts to impose liability on a point source in another state). In City of Tulsa
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Tulsa sued various poultry processors claiming that poultry
waste from factory farms was contaminating the drinking water supply. City of
Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 2003), vacated, No.
01-CV-0900EA(C), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23416 (N.D. Okla. July 16, 2003). The
City of Des Moines also made a recent creative attempt to sue its neighboring
agricultural communities under the Clean Water Act, attempting to characterize
some agricultural pollution as a point source. Notice of Intent to Sue from
William Stowe, Bd. of Water Works Trs. of the City of Des Moines, Iowa, to Rick
Hecht, Chairperson of the Sac Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Gary Nicholson,
Chairperson of the Calhoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Dale Arends, Chairperson
of the Buena Vista Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (Jan. 9, 2014) at 7, available at
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/DMWW
notice-of-intent-to-sue-2.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/D4EC-AUSK
(attempting to characterize tile drainage as a point source). The Iowa notice of
intent to sue also alleged Iowa common law nuisance and trespass claims. Id.
17. Of course, other factors affect the scope of cleanup necessary to meet
SDWA standards. A utility whose source water has many point sources may face

5

8_POLLANS FINAL

506

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

10/1/2015 10:43 AM

[Vol. 32

water pollution must take on this extra cost; utilities outside that
ambit need not. This concern is a more specific variation of the
general concern that the statute imposes uniform standards on
utilities facing highly variable compliance costs.18 Indeed, this is
a standard critique of many types of uniform federal
regulations.19
What is different and particularly troublesome here is that
the variation stems from underlying disparate application of the
“polluter pays” principle. Because a large category of polluters are
not responsible for the costs of the water pollution they cause, a
subset of water utilities are saddled with extra costs. Ratepayers
ultimately bear the burden of this arbitrary allocation of costs.
Although there is some federal and state financial assistance, a
substantial portion of increased compliance costs falls to water
users.20
This allocation of responsibility is often inefficient. In some
cases, it is less costly to control the source than it is to filter or
treat at the tap, particularly where increased contamination

a larger burden than one with fewer, even if all those sources are complying
with their Clean Water Act obligations. Likewise, a utility that relies heavily on
groundwater, which is generally not directly policed under the Clean Water Act,
may face similar problems. See JAMES SALZMAN, DRINKING WATER: A HISTORY
127-31 (2013) (describing the threat of fracking).
18. In the context of the SDWA, proponents of less uniform regulations
believe that the statute imposes costly obligations whether or not they are
relevant to different regions. Some also believe that localities should have the
leeway to opt for lower safety standards if that is their preference.
19. See NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS
ON SMALL FIRMS 7 (2010); Ashlea Ebeling, The Other Federal Budget, FORBES
(Oct.
1,
2003,
11:20
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2003/10/01/cz_ae_
1001beltway.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ8D-YV7V; Jim Tankersley,
Report: New Regulations Cost $216B and 87 Million Hours of Paperwork. What
do they reap?, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/14/report-new-regulations-cost-216-billion-and-87million-hours-of-paperwork/, archived at http://perma.cc/D59T-S8AX.
20. See, e.g., Funding Sources, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/rulesregs/
sdwa/arsenic/funding.cfm (last updated Mar. 6, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/B7NS-XFBX. Rate increases also depend on the size of a water
district. A 1990s EPA study on water utility financial capacity revealed that for
large systems, compliance required increasing average annual rates by about
three dollars per household; for smaller systems, the average increase was $145.
Steinzor, supra note 9, at 208-09.
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necessitates building entirely new treatment facilities.21 In
theory, if a water utility determines that source protection is
cheaper than building or renovating a treatment or filtration
facility, it should engage in Coasian bargaining and pay for
protection rather than build or renovate the treatment or
filtration facility.22 Some water utilities are able to take control of
their source water via land purchase or through green payments
to land owners to reduce their pollution.23 New York City is one
of the best examples of a large urban water system that has
successfully protected its source waters and does not filter its
water.24 But for many municipalities and water utilities the
transaction costs to take control of source water are simply too
high. These transaction costs may include, among others,
difficulty identifying sources, lack of political will at the state
level to develop nonpoint source pollution controls, lack of will

21. See, e.g., Mark D. Hoffer, The New York City Watershed Memorandum of
Agreement: Forging a Partnership to Protect Water Quality, 18 U. BALTIMORE J.
ENVTL. L. 17 (2010); Stephanie Perez, Note and Comment, New York City’s
Drinking Water—Champagne or Beer?, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 859 (1995).
22. See generally James M. Buchanan, The Coase Theorem and the Theory of
the State, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 579 (1973).
23. The 1996 Amendments to the SDWA acknowledged the importance of
source water protection and created a mechanism for water utilities to engage in
source control as an alternative to filtration and treatment. Safe Drinking
Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182 (1996) (codified as
amended in throughout title 42 of the U.S. Code). Filtration avoidance is
available where the utility demonstrates adequate ownership or control over the
source watershed: “[t]he public water system must demonstrate through
ownership and/or written agreements with landowners within the watershed
that it can control all human activities which may have an adverse impact on
the microbiological quality of the source water.” 40 C.F.R. § 141.71(b)(iv)(2)(iii)
(2015). Filtration avoidance is also a possibility where a utility relies on water
from “uninhabited, undeveloped watersheds in consolidated ownership, and
having control over access to, and activities in, those watersheds.” 42 U.S.C. §
300g-1(b)(7)(C)(v) (2012).
24. See, e.g., About Watershed Protection, NYC ENVTL. PROT.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/watershed_protection/about.shtml
(last
visited Feb, 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZQ5X-BMTR; New York City
Water Supply, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov
/lands/25599.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZM3PM7M6.
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among polluters to engage in negotiation, or lack of expertise at
the public water utility about source control options.25
The ancillary benefits of prevention at the source—beyond
safer drinking water—also sway this cost benefit analysis.
Prevention at the source protects aquatic ecosystems, creating
benefits for biodiversity, the recreation industry, the fishing
industry, and for agriculture itself where pollution affects sources
of irrigation water.26 Agricultural nonpoint source pollution
generates numerous environmental and human health costs. The
SDWA mitigates only one of those costs.
Finally, as the title of this essay suggests, the interaction
between the two statutes must be understood in the broader
context of the food system. Water is food too. I mean this in the
literal sense: the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act defines food as
“articles used for food or drink for man or other animals.”27 But,
water is often excluded from discussions about the importance of
protecting our food system. The agriculture industry has been
very successful at curbing federal environmental regulation.28
Among the industry’s wide-ranging rhetoric is the argument that
meager regulation generates the benefit of cheap food, which we
all enjoy. But letting farmers off the hook in the name of cheap

25. Even New York City would likely not be able to achieve the level of source
control it now enjoys had it not taken significant steps to obtain that control
over a century ago. In the late nineteenth century, the City annexed lands and
protected large swaths of land for watershed protection at a time when there
was widespread support for this kind of aggressive step to protect the City’s
economic competitiveness and with little resistance from the surrounding
territories. See generally MATTHEW GANDY, CONCRETE AND CLAY: REWORKING
NATURE IN NEW YORK CITY 18-23 (2003) (retelling the history of New York City’s
water infrastructure and the political context’s that made its development
possible). Given changed political circumstances this model would be difficult, if
not impossible, to replicate today.
26. See MARC O. RIBAUDO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION
FROM NONPOINT SOURCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 23-25 (1999), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1385896/aer782.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
79YA-87W7.
27. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)(1). While the EPA regulates tap water through the
SDWA, the Food and Drug Administration regulates bottle water as a food
pursuant to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).
28. See MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41622, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION AND AGRICULTURE 15 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/R41622.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L539-5Q6X.
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food is less justifiable, if it was ever justifiable, if the spillover
cost is expensive water.29
Even worse, the interplay between the Clean Water Act and
the SDWA pits cities against agricultural areas, and residential
communities against farmers. Although some urban water
utilities and environmental protection agencies have or could
enter into cooperative relationships with their rural hinterlands,
others will take a more antagonistic path.30 This antagonism
perpetuates the perception of an urban/rural dichotomy and
obscures the mutually dependent relationship between the two
that is the basis of a healthy food system.31
To return to the theme of this symposium, reconceptualizing
the future of environmental law, the dynamic between the SDWA
and the Clean Water Act highlights the need for a systems
approach to thinking about environmental regulation of the food
system.32 Water is an environmental system in physical space. It
feeds farms (as irrigation water), it collects their pollution (from
irrigation and stormwater runoff), and it feeds municipalities (as
drinking water). This system crosses political jurisdictions. A
regulatory system that creates antagonism across jurisdictions
makes this physical system more difficult to manage.33

29. Another way to think about this is that water contamination is itself a
food safety issue. Water safety law thus suffers from a similar critical flaw with
the recent food safety modernization. Neither statute adequately addresses
sources of cross contamination. Just as the SDWA provides no mechanism to
address nonpoint source pollution, the Food Safety Modernization Act provides
inadequate mechanisms to protect leafy greens and other fresh produce from
contaminated runoff from concentrated animal feeding operations. 42 U.S.C. §
300f-g; FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885
(codified as amended throughout title 21 of the U.S. Code).
30. See supra text accompanying note 16.
31. WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST,
at xiv-xv (1992).
32. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005) (calling for “a high degree of flexible
coordination across government agencies as well as between public agencies and
private actors” to allow for creative and bigger picture problem solving).
33. Many scholars have recognized the mismatch between environmental
systems and political systems and have considered how political systems should
approach environmental regulation in light of both this fact and the fact that
environmental systems themselves are extraordinarily complex. See, e.g., J.B.
Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
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Access to safe drinking water is nearly ubiquitous in this
country. Efficient (as in cost minimizing) preservation of this
resource requires reconciliation of the various statutory schemes
that govern the resource and the various political jurisdictions
that manage it. Food Law, as an outgrowth of environmental law,
among other things, provides a useful lens through which to
approach this reconciliation. As an emerging discipline, Food Law
invites a fresh examination of water as a complex element of the
food system, drawing together what otherwise might be disparate
environmental law questions related to equitable access to safe
drinking water, preservation of aquatic ecosystems, and
transitions to sustainable agriculture.

Clean up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L.
REV. 933, 981 (1997).
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